It took almost two years of negotiations to reach the original 2015 agreement and involved hundreds of experts from technical and legal fields, including several US experts. Under it, Iran agreed to restrict uranium enrichment and subject itself to inspections in exchange for sanctions relief.
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But Trump pulled the US out of that deal, calling it “the worst deal ever.” Ahead of the initial US-Israeli strikes on Iran in late February, the US had made new demands – including additional restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program, restrictions on its ballistic missile program and ending its support for regional armed groups, primarily in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.
Trump’s latest comments come amid growing uncertainty over whether a second round of talks in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad will go ahead, as a two-week ceasefire between the US-Israel and Iran is set to expire in just a day.
So, what was the JCPOA and how does it compare to Trump’s new demands?
What was JCPOA?
On July 14, 2015, Iran reached an agreement with the European Union and six major powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany – under which these states would withdraw international economic sanctions and allow Iran greater participation in the global economy.
In return, Tehran committed to limiting activities that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.
These include reducing the stockpile of enriched uranium by about 98 percent to less than 300 kilograms (660 lb) and limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent – far below weapons-grade of 90 percent, but sufficient for civilian purposes such as power generation.
Before the JCPOA, Iran operated approximately 20,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges. Under the deal, that number was reduced to a maximum of 6,104, and only older generation machines were restricted to two facilities, subject to international monitoring.
Centrifuges are machines that spin to increase the concentration – enrichment – of the uranium-235 isotope in uranium, a key step in making a potential bomb.
The agreement redesigned Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor to halt plutonium production and introduced one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented by the global nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In return, Iran received relief from international sanctions that had severely damaged its economy. Billions of dollars in frozen assets were released, and restrictions on oil exports and banking were eased.
The deal stalled when Trump formally withdrew Washington from the nuclear deal in 2018, a move widely criticized by domestic and foreign allies, and despite the IAEA saying Iran had complied with the deal up to that point.
In October 2017 he said, “The Iranian regime supports terrorism and spreads violence, bloodshed and chaos throughout the Middle East. That’s why we must end Iran’s continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement.”
He reimposed devastating economic sanctions on Tehran as part of his “maximum pressure” strategy. Their targets were Iran’s oil exports, as well as its shipping sector, banking system and other key industries.
The goal was to force Iran back to the negotiating table to agree to a new deal, including discussions about Tehran’s missile capabilities, further restrictions on enrichment and greater scrutiny of its nuclear program.
What has happened to Iran’s nuclear program since JCPOA?
During the JCPOA period, Iran’s nuclear program was tightly restricted and heavily monitored. The IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran was complying with the terms of the agreement, including a year after Trump announced the US withdrawal from the agreement.
However, starting in mid-2019, Iran began violating the deal’s limits, exceeding limits on uranium reserves and enrichment levels.
In November 2024, Iran said it would activate “new and advanced” centrifuges. The IAEA confirmed that Tehran had informed the nuclear watchdog that it planned to install more than 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium.
In December 2024, the IAEA said Iran was rapidly enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, approaching the 90 percent threshold required for weapons-grade material. More recently, in 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440 kilograms (970 pounds) of 60 percent enriched uranium.
What are Trump’s latest demands for Iran’s nuclear program?
The US and its ally, Israel, are pressuring Iran to agree to zero uranium enrichment and have accused Iran of working towards building nuclear weapons, despite providing no evidence for their claims.
They also want Iran’s estimated 440 kg stockpile of 60pc enriched uranium to be removed. Although this is below weapons-grade, it is the point at which it becomes very fast to achieve the 90 percent enrichment required for nuclear weapons production.
Iran has insisted that its enrichment efforts are for civilian purposes only. It is a signatory to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
In March 2025, the US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, testified to Congress that the US “continues to assess that Iran is not producing nuclear weapons”.
On Sunday, Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian said in a strongly worded statement that Trump had no right to “deprive” Iran of its nuclear rights.
What else is Trump asking for?
ban on ballistic missiles
Before the US-Israeli war over Iran began, Tehran had always insisted that negotiations should focus exclusively on Iran’s nuclear program.
However, American and Israeli demands extended beyond this. Just before the war began, Washington and Israel demanded severe restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Analysts say the demand was at least partly driven by the fact that several Iranian missiles penetrated Israel’s much-vaunted “Iron Dome” defense system during the 12-day war between the two countries in June last year. Although Israel suffered only a few casualties, it was understood to be alarmed.
For his part, Trump has repeatedly warned, without any evidence, about the dangers of Iran’s long-range missiles, claiming that Iran is building them “in very high numbers” and that they could “overwhelm Iron Dome”.
Iran has said that its right to maintain missile capabilities cannot be compromised. The JCPOA did not impose any limits on the development of ballistic missiles.
However, a UN resolution adopted in July 2015 when adopting the nuclear deal stipulated that Iran “may not carry out any activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.
Ending support for proxy groups
The US and Israel have also demanded that Iran stop supporting its non-state allies across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and several groups in Iraq. Together, these groups are known as Iran’s “axis of resistance”.
In May last year, during the GCC meeting in Riyadh, Trump had said that Tehran should “stop sponsoring terrorism, stop its bloody proxy war, and permanently and verifiably stop pursuing nuclear weapons”.
During his State of the Union address to Congress, three days before the war on Iran began in February, Trump accused Iran and “its murderous proxies” of spreading “terrorism and nothing but death and hatred.”
Iran has refused to negotiate about limiting its support for these armed groups.
Can Trump really get a new deal that is ‘much better’ than the JCPOA?
According to Andreas Craig, associate professor of security studies at King’s College, London, Trump is more likely to achieve a new deal that closely resembles the JCPOA, which would have “some form of restrictions on enrichment, possibly with a sunset clause and international supervision”.
“Iran could get access to frozen assets and have sanctions lifted much more quickly than under the JCPOA, as it would not agree to a long-term, gradual lifting of sanctions,” Craig explained.
However, he warned that the political landscape in Tehran has hardened. “Iran is now a far more radical and less pragmatic player who will play tough at every turn. Trump cannot count on any goodwill in Tehran,” he said.
“The IRGC is now firmly in charge … with potentially new powerful and tested levers such as the Strait of Hormuz,” he said, referring to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which operates as an elite military force parallel to the army and wields a large amount of political and economic power in Iran. It is a constitutionally recognized part of the Iranian military and answers directly to the Supreme Leader.
Overall, Craig asserted, a US-Israeli war over Iran “leaves the world in a worse position than Trump’s JCPOA”, even if a new agreement is ultimately reached.
Furthermore, since the repeal of the JCPOA, the US and Israel have waged two wars on Iran, including the current one. The 12-day war in June last year included attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites and killed more than 1,000 people.
Attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have continued since the latest war began on February 28, including the Natanz enrichment facility, the Isfahan nuclear complex, the Arak heavy water reactor and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Still, Craig of King’s College said there was still room for a negotiated outcome if Tehran and Washington withdrew their demands.
He said, “Both sides can compromise on enrichment limits and a temporary halt on enrichment. But Iran will not give up its sovereignty to fully enrich, and the Trump administration must meet them halfway.”
“Although the Iranians will be committed on paper to not developing nuclear weapons, they will want to keep R&D (research and development) in this area alive.”
He said economic incentives will be central. “Equally, Iran would like to gain immediate access to capital and liquidity. Here, the Trump administration is already willing to compromise.”
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