Ever since Donald Trump announced he could end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours,” much of the world has been waiting to see if he can force Moscow and Kiev into a deal. Millions of views and scrolls, miles of news feeds and mountains of forecasts have been burned on that question.
Trump stoked this hope by insisting that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was running out of options and would eventually have to accept his deal. In reality, the opposite is true. It is Trump who has no influence. He can threaten Nicolas Maduro with possible military action in or around Venezuela, but he has no influence on Vladimir Putin. Any harsh sanctions that hurt Russia would also hit the broader Western economy, and not a single leader in the West is willing to dismantle the branch on which they sit.
Armed intervention is even more impossible. From the first days of a full-scale invasion, NATO decided to support Ukraine with weapons and training, while avoiding steps that could directly trigger a NATO–Russia war. That situation has not changed.
As a result, Ukraine has fallen into a situation where, with or without adequate support from its allies, it is virtually fighting Russia alone. All talk of peace or a ceasefire has turned out to be a bluff, a way for Vladimir Putin to buy time and regroup. Putin’s strategy depends not only on the patience and political unity of Ukraine’s military but also its allies. The United States has now circulated a revised version of its peace framework, softening some of the most contentious points after consultation with Kiev and several European governments. Yet the Kremlin is demanding major territorial concessions and the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces. Russia says that without this it will not stop its progress. Ukraine, for its part, maintains that it will not leave the region.
Once it became clear that diplomatic routes would yield no success, the United States halted arms supplies to Ukraine. Officials blamed the federal government shutdown, although the actual cause was unlikely to be a shortage of movers at the Pentagon. Either way, US military aid has been reduced, mostly consisting of supplies approved under the Biden administration. In his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary-designate Austin Dahmer said: “I am not aware of any pause in (U.S. military) aid to Ukraine.” It sounded less like a serious assessment and more like an admission of ignorance. Every Ukrainian soldier can feel the consequences of a massive reduction in American weapons. Every resident of Kiev and other cities can feel the lack of air defense systems.
Europe has not filled this gap. The EU’s defense industry and joint-procurement schemes have made many promises but little actual money. A few billion euros have been formally committed and very little has been distributed. Member states prefer to rearmament themselves first and Ukraine second, although their own programs are progressing slowly. The EU is divided between governments willing to take more risks to support Kiev and others that fear provoking Russia or weakening their own budgets. Brussels is now pushing a plan for Ukraine to use frozen Russian assets to repay up to 140 billion euros ($162 billion) in loans that could support Kiev’s budget and defense spending over the next two years. Several key member states, which host most of the reserves, remain cautious and without consensus, the plan could stall.
This leaves Ukraine to expand its own production and fight for whatever comes in and whatever is not snatched away by corrupt people like Timur Mindych, who is under investigation in a major procurement case. For now, Ukraine can slow down the enemy at a heavy cost, but that is not enough to win.
The army is in short supply. The government has failed to motivate or organize the country; In fact, it has achieved the opposite. The men are fighting their fourth year of war, while the women cannot wait indefinitely. Divorces are on the rise, burnout is deepening and morale is breaking. Prosecutors have opened more than 255,000 cases for unauthorized absence and more than 56,000 for desertion through 2022. In the first 10 months of 2025 alone, they have recorded approximately 162,500 AWOL cases and 21,600 desertion cases. Other reports show that more than 21,000 soldiers left the army in October, the highest monthly figure ever. Social injustice is increasing.
Demographically, the picture is equally bleak. Ukraine’s population in the area controlled by Kiev has fallen from 50 million at the time of independence to about 31 million in early 2025. Births are lower than death rates and the fertility rate has fallen to about one child per woman.
Against this backdrop, Ukraine is left with three strategic options.
The first option is to accept Putin’s conditions. This would mean surrender, losing political face and giving up territory, but it would keep the Ukrainian state safe. It will also lock the country into long-term insecurity.
The second option is a radical change in Ukraine’s political and military leadership. This would involve rebuilding mobilization, reorganizing command systems, and re-engineering the war effort from the ground up. Ukraine cannot fight a protracted war with institutions that were designed for peacetime politics and rotational deployments.
The third option is to change nothing and maintain the status quo. Ukraine will continue precision strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in hopes of dismantling the Kremlin’s economy and waiting for Putin to die. This is an illusion. If such attacks cannot break tiny Ukraine, they will not break a country many times larger in economic, territorial and demographic terms. Damage will be done, but not enough to force Russia to stop.
Judging by recent statements by Zelensky and several of his European partners, Ukraine has effectively committed itself to the third option. The question is how long this approach can be sustained. Putting aside morale and exhaustion after four years of war, the financial outlook is still gloomy. Ukraine faces a huge budget deficit and public debt that is likely to exceed 100 percent of GDP. Europe has failed to raise needed funds, Belgium has not released frozen Russian assets and economic growth remains weak across the continent. Any significant increase in support will require political courage at a time when voters remain sensitive to recent inflation increases. In the current political climate in Washington, the EU is also unable to bind the United States to long-term commitments.
All this leads to an inevitable conclusion. If Ukraine intends to survive as a state, it will ultimately have to take another path and radically restructure its political and military leadership. Once that moment comes, Moscow’s conditions will be harsher than they are now. The Russian ultimatum is likely to expand from claims on four areas to demands on eight areas, along with tighter control mechanisms, demilitarization and further concessions.
Urgent radical change is needed before Ukraine’s strategic options become further narrow and its ability to resist is eroded.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Al Jazeera.
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