The momentum currently lies with the RSF, which last month defeated its Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) opponents in al-Fashar in the western region of Darfur, unleashing a tidal wave of violence where they have killed at least 1,500 people and forced thousands more to flee.
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SAF troops are still able to repel RSF fighters at Babanusa in West Kordofan, a major transport junction linking several parts of the country. But it will be difficult for the SAF to maintain hold of the city, and if it falls, the RSF will likely advance towards al-Obeid in North Kordofan, an important gateway towards the capital, Khartoum.
The RSF was forced out of Khartoum in March, at a time when the SAF looked to be in dominance in more than two years of war.
But now the tables have turned, and after losing Darfur entirely with the fall of El-Fashar, the SAF is now in danger of losing Kordofan too.
“The RSF have momentum, which they will continue,” said Sudanese political analyst Dalia Abdelmoneim, pointing out that the RSF ally, the SPLM-N, already controls the Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan.
“Hemedti was never going to be satisfied with controlling the Darfur region – he wants the entire country,” he said, using the pseudonym of RSF chief Mohammed Hamdan Daglo.
With the SAF increasingly under pressure and away from purchasing credible weapons, Abdelmoneim believes the balance of power is changing. “The SAF is weak unless they miraculously get their hands on weapons equal to, if not better than, the RSF.”
ceasefire talks
It is notable that RSF’s progress comes despite ongoing mediation efforts by the so-called “Quad” – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States – aimed at ending the fighting.
SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan last Sunday rejected a ceasefire deal proposed by the Quad, saying the deal benefited the RSF. He also criticized the UAE’s participation in the Quad and accused it of supporting the RSF, a claim Abu Dhabi has long denied.
For its part, the RSF on Monday announced an apparently unilateral three-month ceasefire. However, since the announcement, RSF has continued to attack Babanusa.
The Quad mediation efforts, which also include pressure from US President Donald Trump, may be the reason for the recent increase in fighting.
“Ceasefire pressure coming from the Quad, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, is pushing the SAF and RSF to make territorial gains as quickly as possible in case some changes occur during mediation,” said Khuloud Khair, founding director of Confluence Advisory. “Each side will always seek to maximize its position before negotiations.”
Khair explains that both sides were gathering weapons during the summer rainy season, when conditions for fighting were more difficult. Now that conditions are dry, weapons are being “used”, especially as the RSF is euphoric after its victory in al-Fashar.
Kordofan’s strategic importance makes it an important prize, especially if a ceasefire agreement frees areas under each side’s control.
“(Kordofan’s) location makes it important to control because of its agricultural, livestock and petroleum resources,” said retired Lieutenant Colonel Omar Arbab. “The fight for Kordofan is not just territorial – it is about controlling Sudan’s economic backbone.”
Arbab said there is a military rationale behind the RSF’s advance towards Babanusa, as it is the gateway linking their forces in Darfur to al-Obeid. “If the RSF controls it, they could pose a threat to al-Obeid – and will certainly attempt to surround it.”
Khair said, “They have been shelling continuously for several weeks. If they take it, they will redeploy some of those troops towards al-Obeid.” He warned that if the city fell the political blow would be huge. “It is a huge trading center, a regional capital and a major economic victory. It brings the RSF several steps closer to Khartoum.”
potential division
Beyond the battlefield, analysts warn that Kordofan’s escalation is intensifying the fault lines that fragment Sudan’s political and ethnic map.
Khair reported that the fall of al-Fashar had solidified the regional fragmentation of Western Sudan, but added that there were also “dozens of armed groups”, either affiliated with the SAF, the RSF or independent, each controlling their own fiefdoms.
For Khair, the real driver of Sudan’s disintegration is not territory but identity. “This war has become extremely ethnicized by both the SAF and the RSF so they can mobilize forces. Because of this, you now have a divide of communities who believe that their ethnic interests are served by the SAF, the RSF or other groups.”
He said, this ethnic competition is now driving the direction of war more than military strategy. “There is no single Sudanese project at the moment – not intellectually, militarily, politically or economically – and this is catalysing fragmentation.”
However, Abdelmoneim warned that some within the SAF may be willing to accept fragmentation. He said, “Undoubtedly, there are elements within the SAF that would be very happy with further fragmentation of the country so that they can continue to rule the Arab Sudanese side.” “Losing Darfur is not an issue, and they are willing to give up the alliance with the joint forces on this,” he said, referring to former rebel groups largely based in Darfur and affiliated with the SAF.
There are many Sudanese non-Arabs in Darfur, and they have been particularly targeted by RSF attacks.
But Abdelmoneim believes that any approach that involves abandoning Darfur is not sustainable. “Without joint forces and other groups under their political-military umbrella, they cannot win. And how do you counter public opinion when Sudanese people see the SAF as an entity that is going to lose or break the country?”
Arbab takes a more cautious approach. Although he acknowledges the reality of actual ruptures, he believes that a formal partition is unlikely. Arbab said, “Separation is not on the table at the moment, as the structure of the coalition on both sides requires a political project encompassing the whole of Sudan. Social complexities and the diversity of actors make such an option extremely difficult.”
human outcome
As the front line expands, Korodofan now faces the possibility of a humanitarian disaster on the scale seen in Darfur. Abdelmoneim drew a direct parallel to the warnings issued before al-Fashar’s fall. “The atrocities committed will be on a different scale,” he warned. “We may not get as many video uploads as before, but the crimes will still be committed.”
Abdemonim said international inaction has emboldened all armed actors. “The spirit of impunity persists and will increase as long as the international community is content to simply issue statements and do nothing else.”
Arbab also expressed the same concern. Global attention was focused on al-Fashar because the violence there contained “elements of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”, he said. But the dynamics of Kordofan are different. In Babanusa, SAF and RSF forces come from the same overlapping tribal and ethnic communities, making the violence distinct from Darfur’s ethnic genocide. Yet the risks remain profound: reprisal killings, sieges and mass displacement.
Khair warned that humanitarian access to Kordofan is already impossible. “I don’t see the SAF giving access, and I don’t see the RSF giving access to areas under their control,” he said. Unlike Darfur, Kordofan lacks open borders through which aid can flow. “The access problems are even greater when you are away from the international border.”
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