It is no longer possible to explain the Yemeni scenario only through the prism of politics. The developments observed in the southern Yemeni governorates under government control in recent months clearly indicate that security and military matters have become the decisive factors in determining the course of power on the ground. Unless the issue of integration of security control and military command is resolved, no governmental or political system will be sustainable.
Nor can one ignore the growing Saudi-Emirati rift between the two allies that have shaped southern Yemen militarily, politically and economically in recent years, which has a direct impact on the balance of power and stability.
Over the years, a complex security structure has taken shape in the southern governorates, consisting of official units and other units that emerged during the war. Some of these units are linked to state institutions, while others were established with Emirati support, such as the forces of the Southern Transitional Council, which number in the thousands, or were established through local arrangements according to the circumstances of the conflict.
Although steps have been taken in recent months to restructure the landscape following the defeat of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which announced its dissolution in Hadramaut and al-Mahra on January 3, 2026, security control remains uneven from one governorate to another. Furthermore, the security and military structures of the STC have not completely disappeared; Some have been redeployed, while the fate of others remains unknown.
Security agencies in the temporary capital Aden operate within a complex framework. Some units formerly affiliated with the STC have seen their personnel and weapons disappear, while others have been renamed or redeployed. However, long-standing networks of influence remain, and transfers of leadership or redeployment of camps reflect attempts to rebalance power rather than definitive solutions to the situation.
The same applies, to varying degrees, to Lahij, Abyan, Dhale, Shabwah and Hadramaut, where the state’s ability to assert effective authority varies, as does the level of coordination between official security forces and the structures that emerged during the war.
The most sensitive issue at this stage is the integration of military and security structures in the defense and interior ministries. The state wants to end the parallel security authority, but faces complex challenges in the process, including differing sources of funding for some units, differing political loyalties, fear of losing local influence among some commanders, and considerations related to the structure of these forces. As a result, integration appears to be gradual, relying more on replanning and restructuring than on decisive measures that might risk triggering conflict.
Now the government based in Aden, in southern Yemen, finds itself facing a delicate equation: it must enforce its security mandate without plunging the country into renewed internal conflict.
The transition from multiple armed groups to a state monopoly on the use of force requires political consensus, regional support, and international support. Any hasty move could rekindle internal conflict, especially given current political and regional sensitivities, as well as fears that the Saudi-Emirati dispute could once again give rise to grassroots confrontation.
For this reason, government efforts are focused first on establishing a stable security environment.
This trajectory cannot be understood without considering the regional dimension. Saudi Arabia views Yemen as of direct strategic importance to its national security and wants the emergence of a stable state on its southern border.
The dispute between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially after Yemen requested the withdrawal of Emirati forces from its territory, has become a significant factor shaping the course of the crisis, especially amid Saudi allegations that Abu Dhabi continues to support the STC and strengthen its influence on the ground.
Yemen today is part of a broader regional landscape, linked by the dynamics of the Red Sea and sea routes, competition for influence in the Horn of Africa, and tensions stretching from Sudan to Somalia to the Gulf. For this reason, international actors – particularly the United States – are keen to keep the situation in Yemen under control, fearing that a security collapse could trigger an intra-Gulf conflict, threaten international shipping, create space for a new wave of armed groups, or allow the Houthis to exploit the situation.
In the next phase, the government is likely to continue efforts to strengthen security control in Aden and other southern governorates, including Hadramaut, bordering Saudi Arabia, while gradually integrating military units and maintaining political balance to prevent renewed conflict.
The success of these efforts will determine whether the country moves toward gradual stability or another round of reshaping of power centers. Given this reality, the central question remains: Who actually has the capacity to enforce security on the ground, especially as some actors are pushing the Southern Transitional Council toward escalating tensions that could rekindle the conflict?
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
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