However, for Europe more broadly and the EU in particular, there is far more at stake than the principles Washington has rarely prioritized in its foreign policy.
Deterring Putin from further aggression and ensuring that Ukraine is politically and economically stable are at the core of the bloc’s security and political concerns. Failure to achieve a resolution to the conflict would jeopardize the bloc’s own long-term security.
Of course, all this must be managed while ensuring that the Trump administration does not further jeopardize European security by once again casting doubt on its commitment to NATO’s security infrastructure. But belatedly, Europe has already begun to wake up to these concerns. As of last year, the 23 NATO members were spending 2 percent of GDP on defense, and the alliance agreed to a new goal of increasing core defense spending to at least 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035, with 1.5 percent of GDP to be spent on critical infrastructure and expanding their defense industrial bases.
Europe has also overtaken the US in total military aid to Ukraine for the first time since June 2022, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker, with 72 billion euros ($83.6bn) allocated by the end of April compared to Washington’s 65 billion euros ($75.5bn).
Yet, regardless of the outcome of the Trump administration’s efforts to push Ukraine toward a negotiating position that Putin might be willing to accept, increased European support is not enough to overcome the impasse in US funding. Military aid is also only part of the picture: Kiev is also dependent on financial support from the West to ensure the continued functioning of its government. And the reconstruction bill continues to grow as Russian attacks and airstrikes continue. In February, the World Bank estimated it would be $524 billion (506 billion euros) – about 280 percent of Kyiv’s 2024 GDP.
Without dramatic action, Europe risks being left to Trump’s whims as a matter of its future security, despite him bowing to his demands not only on NATO spending and military support for Ukraine, but also on trade through agreements that have seen the US’s average tariff rate on imports from the EU and Britain rise sharply.
But there is a clear policy choice that Europe can make to ensure that financial support for Kiev remains adequate in the years to come and to shape the outcome of any resolution to the conflict, while simultaneously preventing Putin from further aggrandizing Russia.
The European Union and the United Kingdom may move to seize sovereign Russian funds frozen in their jurisdiction from 2022. Most importantly, they could seize the 185 billion euros ($214.8 billion) frozen in Belgium-based clearing house Euroclear – most of which is now in cash and thus can be rapidly deployed or reinvested – as well as Russian government funds frozen in Euroclear’s Luxembourg-based rival, Clearstream, the amount of which is estimated at Rs. About 20 billion euros ($23.2 billion).
Europe is not unaware of this possibility and, in fact, has been debating doing so for months. Euroclear assets have already been used to underwrite a $50 billion (43 billion euros) loan to Ukraine finalized in January 2025, secured on the income from those assets.
Europe was expected to put forward a plan to create a new loan – amounting to up to 140 billion euros ($162.6 billion) – secured on assets at the European Council meeting on 18–19 December, after delaying a final decision at the previous council meeting on 23 October. The delay was mainly due to the insistence of the Belgian government, which has demanded compensation from the rest of Europe while supporting the Kremlin’s point that such a move would happen. Unprecedented.
Still, there is ample precedent. German and Japanese government assets were confiscated by the United States during World War II. In the latter case, Japan’s assets were seized even before the attack on Pearl Harbor, most of which were later retained under the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.
The Kremlin’s threats to embroil Belgium in decades-old litigation are also being exaggerated. They rely on pre-Soviet bilateral investment treaties, which Putin and his proxies have failed to successfully enforce, to freeze their assets or challenge previous sanctions. Additionally, there are dozens of unresolved claims worth billions of dollars against Russia in European courts — including a nearly 13 billion euro ($15 billion) arbitration award won by energy firm Uniper against Gazprom for gas supply disruptions in 2022. The largest and most significant case remains the 2014 award to former Yukos shareholders over the Kremlin’s takeover of their company. That award survived all appeals: In October 2025, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands rejected Russia’s final challenge, confirming that the award – now worth more than $65 billion including interest – is final and enforceable against Russian state assets worldwide. However, enforcement will still depend on locating suitable Russian assets that the courts are willing and able to seize.
The Kremlin will certainly engage in legislation and litigation over these disputes, as it has done repeatedly during Putin’s tenure. But it will lose, and when its national interests are at stake, it will have to pay the price. Russia has repeatedly complied with adverse decisions when vital access to Western markets or assets was at stake. The only clear case of money owed by the West or Russia as a result of litigation arising from Russia’s war is a settlement paid by Russian state insurer NSK and aviation firm Aeroflot over Putin’s 2022 seizure of planes leased from Western companies.
There is no excuse for Europe’s delay in acting so far. Each month of inaction increases the financial burden on Europe and increases the likelihood that Washington will make a deal that ignores European interests. The question is now acute: how to ensure Ukraine’s continued financing and ability to maintain its defense. It is even more important that Europe act before the Trump administration tries to reach a deal with the Kremlin.
The 28-point “peace plan” drafted by Kremlin insiders and signed last month by Trump’s special envoy and longtime aide Steve Witkoff not only involves diverting these same frozen funds and even demands that Europe itself provide an additional $100 billion, but would also divert frozen Russian assets away from Ukraine’s reconstruction, placing the additional financial burden directly on Europe. Such an agreement would leave Europe paying an even bigger bill if the Kremlin fails to follow through on its commitments – as it did with the ceasefire agreements signed in 2014 and 2015 after its initial invasion of Ukraine.
Europe has the right to put forward its political, economic and military defense in negotiations over the future of Ukraine, and should not be afraid to use it.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Al Jazeera.
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